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Throughout the eighteenth century Scottish philosophers engage in lively debates about 
human agency, the will, and the powers that influence, incite, or determine human action. 
These debates culminate in the publications of Thomas Reid’s Essays on the Active Powers of 
Man (2010 [1788]) and Dugald Stewart’s The Philosophy of the Active and Moral Powers of Man 
(1854–1860: VI–VII).  
Reid distinguishes active powers from intellectual powers and understands action as 
the exertion of active power (2010 [1788]: I.1, 12–13). He argues that only beings equipped 
with understanding and will can have active powers (2010 [1788]: I.5, 27–29). Reid agrees 
with John Locke (1975 [1690]: II.xxi.5, 236) that our will enables us to begin, forbear, 
continue, or end actions. However, Reid understands active power in a more restricted sense 
than Locke does. For Locke, active powers are dispositions to produce change (1975 [1690]: 
II.xxi.2, 234). If active powers are exercised they produce actions, which for Locke include 
motions and thoughts (1975 [1690]: II.xxi.4, 235). This means that Locke allows that there 
can be active powers not only within the mental realm, but also in the external material 
world.1 Reid, by contrast, argues that all activity originates from a mind. For Reid, active 
powers are dispositions that are realised by volitions. Reid understands volition as ‘a 
Determination to do, or not to do, something which I believe to be in my Power.’ (2002: 
131) Volitions presuppose some conception of what one wills; thus, they require 
understanding. Although volition and the will are not always carefully distinguished, Reid 
reserves the notion ‘the will’ for the faculty, and ‘volition’ for the act of willing (2002: 130, 
2010 [1788]: II.1, 46) The will, which manifests itself in acts of volition, is a power to 
																																																						
1 For further discussion, see Mattern (1980). 
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determine actions (2010 [1788]: II.1, 46). Reid’s conception of the will builds on Locke’s 
philosophy, but he observes that it is unfortunate that some other philosophers have used 
the term ‘will’ is a broader sense to include ‘desire, aversion, hope, fear, joy, sorrow, all our 
appetites, passions and affections, as different modifications of the will’ (Reid 2010 [1788]: 
II.1, 46). For Reid it is important to distinguish the incitements and motives that influence 
actions from the determination of action itself. Thus, he makes explicit that he ‘do[es] not 
comprehend under [the] term [‘will’] any incitements or motives which may have an influence 
upon our determinations, but solely the determination itself, and the power to determine.’ 
(2010 [1788]: II.1, 47) 
Reid and Stewart both follow Locke (1975 [1690]: II.xxi) in distinguishing desire 
from volition and in arguing that actions are produced by the agent, rather than by motives 
or desires (Reid 2010 [1788]: II.1, 46–49, 2002: 131–32, Stewart 1854–1860: VI:344–50). 
According to Reid, motives can give advice, but they do not determine actions. Reid and 
Stewart oppose the view that the will is necessarily determined by motives—a view that 
Henry Home, Lord Kames and others defend. In Reid’s view, Kames is one example of a 
philosopher who fails to distinguish between motives and the determination of action. Yet 
it is not obvious that the distinction between desires, motives, or incitements, on the one 
hand, and volition, or the determination of action, on the other hand, holds attraction to all 
philosophers. It plays an important role for Reid and Stewart, who are both defenders of 
libertarian free will, but is there any ground for a defender of the doctrine of necessity such 
as Kames to distinguish motives from determinations of actions? 
This essay traces the development of the philosophical debates concerning active 
powers and human agency in eighteenth-century Scotland. I examine how and why Scottish 
philosophers depart from Locke’s and other traditional conceptions of the will. Moreover, I 
show that one consequence of altering the understanding of the will is that desires, passions, 
or motives often play a more significant role than in Locke’s, Reid’s or Stewart’s accounts of 
the production of action. The different views about human agency are often informed by 
widely disputed questions concerning liberty and necessity and, where relevant, I turn to 
these disputes. 
Since Reid, Stewart, and several other Scottish philosophers build upon Locke’s 
philosophy, it is helpful to start with Locke, whose account of power and the will is the focus 
of section I. Next, I show in section II how Francis Hutcheson and George Turnbull shift 
the focus of debates about liberty and the will and emphasise the importance of self-mastery 
and the cultivation of right habits. Section III focuses on David Hume’s account of human 
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agency. His claims that volition and action are separate and that the supposed causal 
mechanism between volition and action is incomprehensible are widely accepted in the 
eighteenth century, but Hume’s novel contribution to the debates lies in his new definitions 
of cause and necessity. I argue that his new definition of necessity needs to be taken seriously 
by interpretations of his claim that moral responsibility presupposes necessity. More 
precisely, I propose that Hume can be said to emphasise that moral responsibility 
presupposes a constant conjunction between stable character traits and action. Thus, like in 
Hutcheson’s and Turnbull’s philosophy, the cultivation of habits and the development of 
stable character traits play an important role in Hume’s philosophy. Henry Home, Lord 
Kames, criticises of Hume for reducing necessary connection to a customary act of the 
imagination. Kames is a defender of the doctrine of necessity and his arguments that all 
actions necessarily presuppose prior motives are the focus of section IV. Section V examines 
responses by the common sense philosophers James Beattie, Thomas Reid, and Dugald 
Stewart to Hume and Kames. All three are defenders of libertarian free will and I pay 
particular attention to Reid’s account of motives, including his distinction between animal 
and rational motives.  Section VI focuses on the role of the passions in Hume’s, Adam 
Smith’s, and Reid’s moral philosophy. I show that Reid aims to restrict the boundaries of the 
passions, but at the same time he is not very sensitive to the sophisticated account of the 
passions that Hume develops. For Hume passions can be regulated both by our selves and 
by others through sympathetic interaction. Given that sympathy plays an extensive role in 
Hume’s and Smith’s philosophy, I ask whether sympathy, understood in Hume’s or Smith’s 
sense, could play the same role that rational principles of action play in Reid’s philosophy. I 
argue that Reid would not be willing to adopt Hume’s or Smith’s views due to their 
underlying disagreement about liberty. In the final section VII I reflect on the changes that 
classifications of principles of actions undergo in eighteenth and early nineteenth-century 
Scotland. 
 
 
I Background: Locke 
 
John Locke’s (1632–1704) An Essay concerning Human Understanding (1975 [1690]) is widely 
read by Scottish philosophers in the eighteenth century. As becomes clearer below, several 
Scottish philosophers directly engage with Locke’s account of power and the will and 
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develop his views or distance themselves from Locke. This section introduces aspects of 
Locke’s account that influenced the philosophical debates in Scotland. 
Locke distinguishes the power of thinking from the power of volition. The former 
is called the understanding and the latter the will. Understanding and will are two different 
faculties of the mind (1975 [1690]: II.xxi.2, 234). He introduces the will as follows: 
 
This at least I think evident, That we find in our selves a Power to begin or forbear, 
continue or end several actions of our minds, and motions of our Bodies, barely by a 
thought or preference of the mind ordering, or as it were commanding the doing or not 
doing such or such a particular action. This Power which the mind has, thus to order the 
consideration of any Idea, or the forbearing to consider it; or to prefer the motion of any 
part of the body to its rest, and vice versâ in any particular instance is that which we call 
the Will. (1975 [1690]: II.xxi.5, 236)  
 
This means that the will is our power to self-determine some actions of the mind and 
motions of the body. This power is exercised by means of volitions. 
The exertion of power involves change; it involves someone or something that acts 
and something that is acted upon. This prompts Locke to claim that ‘Power … is twofold, viz. 
as able to make, or able to receive any change: The one may be called Active, and the other 
Passive Power.’ (1975 [1690]: II.xxi.2, 234)2 For Locke active and passive powers are always go 
together. This means that whenever there is active power there is also passive power; they 
are like two sides of the same coin. Although Reid is generally sympathetic to Locke’s view, 
he rejects Locke’s invention of the notion of passive power as ‘a misapplication of the word.’ 
(2010 [1788]: I.3, 21) For Reid it does not make sense to speak of a passive power, because 
it ‘is no power at all.’ (2010 [1788]: I.3, 21) Instead Reid argues that powers should be divided 
into speculative and active powers. The former belong to the understanding and the latter to 
the will. 
Locke argues that from observing that we have the power to begin, forbear, continue 
or end an action, we form the ideas of liberty and necessity (1975 [1690]: II.xxi.7, 237). He 
emphasises that liberty belongs only to agents, because liberty is a power and powers belong 
to substances (1975 [1690]: II.xxi.14–16, 240–41).3 Hence, he claims that it does not make 
sense to ask whether the will is free or not, because those who ask this question ask ‘whether 
																																																						
2 See also Locke (1975 [1690]: II.xxi.72, 285–86). 
3 Reid makes a similar point in Reid (2002: 132). 
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one Power has another Power, one Ability another Ability’ (1975 [1690]: II.xxi.16, 241). He 
considers this to be an absurd question, because the will is not a substance. Although these 
passages intimate that an agent for Locke is a substance, it is worth noting that Locke remains 
agnostic concerning the materiality or immateriality of thinking substances.4 In that respect 
his view differs from Reid’s who argues that all action presupposes an immaterial substance 
or mind that initiates the action (1995).  
As already mentioned, Locke makes another important observation by noting that 
desire and volition are two distinct acts of the mind: 
 
For he, that shall turn his thoughts inwards upon what passes in his mind, when he 
wills, shall see, that the will or power of Volition is conversant about nothing, but our 
own Actions; terminates there; and reaches no farther; and that Volition is nothing, 
but that particular determination of the mind, whereby, barely by a thought, the mind 
endeavours to give rise, continuation, or stop to any Action, which it takes to be in 
its power. This well considered plainly shews, that the Will is perfectly distinguished 
from Desire, which in the very same Action may have a quite contrary tendency from 
that which our Wills sets us upon. (1975 [1690]: II.xxi.30 2–5, 250) 
 
According to Locke, it is important to distinguish desire from volition, because it is possible 
to have desires that are contrary to volitions. For instance, I may desire to be at a beach on 
a sunny island, while at the same time I form the volition to go to my office to work. Both 
Reid and Stewart draw attention to Locke’s distinction between volition and desire when 
criticising their predecessors who neglect it (Reid 2010 [1788]: II.1, 46–49, Stewart 1854–
1860: VI:345–46).  
Given that one can have multiple desires, including conflicting desires, the question 
arises which of these desires become volitions. According to Locke, unattainable desires can 
be put aside; they do not result in volitions, because it would be a waste of labour and 
contrary to the nature of rational beings to try to bring about something that it unattainable 
(1975 [1690]: II.xxi.40 2–5, 257–258). With regard to all other desires, he asserts, that 
commonly the strongest and most pressing desire results in volition, and subsequently action 
(1975 [1690]: II.xxi.40 2–5, 47 2–5, 257–258, 263). However, Locke acknowledges that we 
are not always governed by the strongest and most pressing desires. As intelligent beings, 
human agents have the power to suspend desire. Suspension of desire makes it possible ‘to 
																																																						
4 See Locke (1975 [1690]: IV.iii.6, 539–43, 1823: 4:33–37). 
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examine, view, and judge, of the good or evil of what we are going to do’ (1975 [1690]: 
II.xxi.47 2–5, 263). Thereby agents can consider whether an action contributes to their real 
long-term happiness and disregard immediate pleasures in favour of long-term happiness. 
For Locke the ability to suspend desire is ‘the source of all liberty’ (1975 [1690]: II.xxi.47 2–
5, 263).5 
 
 
II Freedom and self-mastery in Francis Hutcheson and George Turnbull 
 
Francis Hutcheson (1694–1746) plays a major role in the development of British moral 
philosophy and Scottish Enlightenment philosophy. His metaphysical and moral writings 
advance the debates concerning human nature of his day. He opposes egoist views of human 
nature advocated by philosophers such as Thomas Hobbes and Bernard Mandeville. For 
Hutcheson humans are not merely self-interested beings, but rather he argues that 
benevolence and sociability form an inherent part of the human constitution and are rooted 
in a moral sense. Moreover, his account of human nature and his emphasis on human 
benevolence offers an alternative to the Calvinist doctrine that humans are by nature sinful.6 
This section focuses on his understanding of liberty and the will and elicits how he rethinks 
existing conceptions of liberty and the will in light of his account of human nature.7  
Hutcheson does not offer a detailed treatment of liberty and the will in his mature 
writings and the most detailed treatment of the topic can be found his A Synopsis of Metaphysics 
Comprehending ONTOLOGY and PNEUMATOLOGY (2006 [1742]). This early work is a 
textbook, written in Latin for the instruction of students. It provides Hutcheson’s critical 
commentary on Determinationes Pneumatologicae et Ontologicae, a textbook by the Dutch 
metaphysician Gerard de Vries (1703 [1690]). This textbook was recommended by John 
Louden, who was regent at the University of Glasgow and in 1727 became the first Professor 
of Logic and Rhetoric—a post that he held until his death in 1750. When Hutcheson studied 
at Glasgow between 1710 and 1712 Louden was one of his teachers (Moore 1990: 43). In 
1718 Hutcheson returned to his home country Ireland and established a dissenting academy 
																																																						
5 For further discussion, see LoLordo (2012), Rickless (2013, 2014), Stuart (2013), Walsh 
(2014, forthcoming), Yaffe (2000). 
6 For further discussion, see Carey (2006), Moore (1990, 2006), (Moore and Silverthorne 
2008), (Suderman 2015). 
7 For a more detailed treatment of the topic and Hutcheson’s role in the education of 
students in Ireland and Scotland, see Boeker (forthcoming). 
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in Dublin to prepare students for study in Scotland, and Glasgow in particular. Although A 
Synopsis of Metaphysics was not published until 1742, we can assume that he composed it in the 
1720s for the instruction of students at the Dublin academy. Hutcheson never fully endorsed 
A Synopsis of Metaphysics. The first edition was published without his consent and he was not 
fully satisfied with the altered and enlarged second edition of 1744 (Moore 2006). 
Nevertheless, the work was influential for the instruction of students in the eighteenth 
century, as the five more posthumous editions of 1749, 1756, 1762, 1774, and 1780 attest. A 
Synopsis of Metaphysics provides insight into Hutcheson’s contribution to the textbook tradition 
of Scottish Enlightenment philosophy, though we have to keep in mind that the positions 
presented there may not always reflect Hutcheson’s own mature philosophical views. 
Part II of A Synopsis of Metaphysics focuses on the human mind. There Hutcheson 
adopts the traditional distinction between the understanding and the will and introduces 
them as two powers of the mind. He characterises ‘the faculty of understanding and the faculty 
of willing’ as ‘concerned respectively with knowing things and with rendering life happy’ 
(Hutcheson 2006 [1742]: II.i.2, 112). Already at this stage it becomes clear that Hutcheson 
adds his own voice to the debates. Neither de Vries nor Locke8 introduce the will in terms 
of happiness.9 For de Vries the will concerns freedom and is distinguished from brute 
impulses (1703 [1690] 31).  
Why does Hutcheson understand the will as a faculty that seeks happiness? In 
chapter 2 of Part II, titled ‘On the Will,’ Hutcheson maintains that the will is activated ‘[a]s 
soon as an image of good or evil is presented to the mind.’ (2006 [1742]: II.ii.1, 126). For 
Hutcheson, the will ‘seeks (appetens) every kind of pleasant sensation and all actions, events, 
or external things which seem likely to arouse them, and shuns and rejects everything 
contrary to them.’ (2006 [1742]: II.ii.1, 126) As he elaborates in the 1744 edition, a constant 
desire for happiness is part of our human constitution, but we are not equipped with an 
‘innate notion of the supreme good, or of an aggregation of all good, to which we may refer 
all our intentions.’ (2006 [1742]: II.ii.1, 126) 
How does Hutcheson explain that we choose the greater good rather than other 
options that may appear pleasant in the present moment? He distinguishes between two 
kinds of desire, sensual desire that we share with animals and rational desire, ‘or will in the 
proper sense.’ (2006 [1742]: II.ii.1, 127) The former ‘directs us toward pleasure by a kind of 
																																																						
8 Details of Locke’s view can be found in section I above. 
9 At this stage my interpretation diverges from Moore (2006) who suggest that Hutcheson 
builds on Locke to challenge de Vries’s account of the understanding and the will.  
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blind instinct; it is driven by a quite violent emotion of the mind to obtain certain sensual 
goods and avoid sensual ills. The other is a calm emotion which calls in the counsel of reason 
and pursues things that are judged, in the light of all the circumstances, to be superior, and 
are seized by a nobler sense.’ (2006 [1742]: II.ii.1, 127)10 According to Hutcheson, we have 
control over our desires and the important task is the cultivation of rational desires and a 
calm state of mind: 
 
Whatever men’s freedom may be, if adequate signs of superior goods are put before 
them, anyone who has carefully examined the things which arouse desire, and has 
directed the powers of his mind to this thing, [will find that] all his appetites and 
desires will be stronger or milder in proportion to the goods themselves. Everyone, 
therefore, who has seriously done this will be able to make all his desires for superior 
goods and aversion from the graver evils so strong that he will easily be able at need 
to suppress weaker desires for bad things and his aversion to lesser evils. Thus he 
will be able to shape the whole pattern of his life, so that he will pursue all the nobler 
goods and ignore all the lower things which are incompatible with them. (2006 
[1742]: II.ii.3, 131) 
 
Although Hutcheson acknowledges the existence of sensual desires as part of our human 
psychology, he argues for the superiority of the rational or calm desires. Thereby his project 
takes an intellectual turn and the pursuit of happiness becomes a search for moral truth, 
accompanied by the cultivation of good habits. For Hutcheson deliberation ‘does not depend 
on the will, but necessarily follows the evidence of truth which is put before it’ (2006 [1742]: 
II.ii.3, 129). This leads him to claim that ‘there is no question of liberty here at all, whether 
liberty is taken as the power of doing what we wish and omitting what we do not wish, or a certain 
indifferent power of the mind to turn equally in any direction.’ (2006 [1742]: II.ii.3, 129) He does not 
see the need to decide which of the different definitions of liberty that are introduced in 
metaphysics textbooks is to be preferred, but rather the important point is that deliberation 
is guided by moral truth.  
Having downplayed, or arguably denied, the significance of the question of liberty, 
Hutcheson shifts the focus away from traditional questions of liberty that concerned his 
predecessors and contemporaries towards an experimental study of human desires and a 
																																																						
10 See also Hutcheson (2006 [1742]: II.ii.4, 132–33). 
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normative project that aims at character development and is meant to enable us to control 
our desires.  
According to Hutcheson, ‘the lower desires get their special force from incautious 
associations of ideas’ (2006 [1742]: II.ii.6, 136). For instance, if after eating raspberries one has 
an upset stomach, one may start to imagine that raspberries are unhealthy. In this example 
one erroneously associates raspberries with being unhealthy. More generally, by an act of the 
imagination we often combine certain ideas that are not naturally connected and erroneously 
associate happiness with certain things and evil with others. In order to gain control over our 
lower desires, Hutcheson argues that we have to take these erroneously associated ideas apart 
so that we can discover real goodness (2006 [1742]: II.ii.6–136–37).11 
Although Hutcheson does not offer a detailed discussion of liberty in his later works, 
he develops a detailed theory of different senses and corresponding desires in An Essay on 
the Nature and Conduct of the Passions and Affections, with Illustrations on the Moral Sense (2002 
[1728]). There Hutcheson argues that humans are not merely equipped with external senses, 
but also with an internal sense, a public sense, a moral sense, and a sense of honour (2002 
[1728]: 17–18). Each of these senses is paired with corresponding desires, namely  
 
1. The Desire of sensual Pleasure, (by which we mean that of the external Senses); and 
Aversion to the opposite Pains. 2. The Desires of the Pleasures of Imagination or 
Internal Sense, and Aversion to what is disagreeable to it. 3. Desires of the Pleasures 
arising from Publick Happiness, and Aversion to the Pains arising from the Misery of 
others. 4. Desires of Virtue, and Aversion to Vice, according to the Notions we have 
of the Tendency of Actions to the Publick Advantage or Detriment. 5. Desires of 
Honour, and Aversion to Shame. (2002 [1728]: 18–19) 
 
Hutcheson does not explicitly invoke the traditional distinction between the understanding 
and the will in An Essay. Commonly the external senses are classified under the 
understanding. Thus, it is plausible to suggest that Hutcheson’s account of the different 
senses replaces more traditional conceptions of the understanding and his account of the 
																																																						
11 Hutcheson further develops his account of the association of ideas in his later work An 
Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions and Affections, with Illustrations on the Moral sense 
(2002 [1728]: 20–21, 28, 65–86, 92–93, 104–105, 108–12, 131–32). A more detailed 
discussion of association of ideas can be found in Gill (1996) and Tabb and Wright in this 
volume.  
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different classes of desires more traditional conceptions of the will.12 
In Illustrations on the Moral Sense he anticipates objections from opponents, who may 
question whether his moral sense theory can properly explain the merit of actions, which his 
predecessors have based in free self-determination (2002 [1728]: 178). Hutcheson’s strategy 
is to show that other accounts of merit are consistent with his moral sense theory (178–87). 
Thus, he concludes ‘that the intricate Debates about human Liberty do not affect what is here 
alledged, concerning our moral Sense of Affections and Actions’ (2002 [1728]: 186). 
It is worth noting that, as he engages with potential objections by critics, Hutcheson 
contemplates the possibility that ‘perhaps ’tis not the mere Freedom of Choice which is approved, 
but the free Choice of Publick Good, without any Affection. Then Actions are approved for publick 
Usefulness, and not for Freedom.’ (2002 [1728]: 180) These remarks intimate that Hutcheson 
sees the need to supplement existing debates that focus on the freedom of individual agents 
with considerations of public benevolence. However, what resources does Hutcheson have 
to convince his critics of the importance of public benevolence? 
Hutcheson regards agents not merely as individuals, but rather as members of ‘one 
great System’ and those who live in harmony with the system as a whole will be happy. He 
writes: 
 
It was observed above, how admirably our Affections are contrived for good in the 
whole. Many of them indeed do not pursue the private Good of the Agent; nay, many 
of them, in various Cases, seem to tend to his detriment, by concerning him violently 
in the Fortunes of others, in their Adversity, as well as their Prosperity. But they all aim 
at good, either private or publick: and by them each particular Agent is made, in a great 
measure, subservient to the good of the whole. Mankind are thus insensibly link’d 
together, and make one great System, by an invisible Union. He who voluntarily 
continues in this Union, and delights in employing his Power for his Kind, makes 
himself happy: He who does not continue this Union freely, but affects to break it, 
makes himself wretched; nor yet can he break the Bonds of Nature. His publick Sense, 
his Love of Honour, and the very Necessities of his Nature, will continue to make him 
depend upon his System, and engage him to serve it, whether he inclines to it or not. 
Thus we are formed with a View to a general good End; and may in our own Nature 
discern a universal Mind watchful for the whole. (2002 [1728]: 118) 
 
																																																						
12 Further support for this reading can be found in Hutcheson (2007 [1742]). 
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This passage resembles ideas that Anthony Ashley Cooper, the Third Earl of Shaftesbury 
develops in The Moralists, which is one of the works included in volume 2 of his major work 
Characteristicks of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times (2001 [1711]). Shaftesbury proposes that the 
search for true happiness leads to the realisation that individuals are part of a universal 
mind and that individual selves are copies of the universal mind, or self of nature. Since 
individuals are not only part of a universal mind, but also resemble it insofar as they are 
copies of it, it seems natural ‘That the particular MIND should seek its Happiness in 
conformity with the general-one, and endeavour to resemble it in its highest Simplicity and 
Excellence.’ (2001 [1711]: 2:201)13 
In light of the striking similarities, Hutcheson’s considerations concerning public 
benevolence and the universal mind are certainly indebted to Shaftesbury:14 For Shaftesbury 
happiness is a matter of moral truth and to reach genuine happiness one has to understand 
one’s place in the universe as a whole and live in harmony with it. Hutcheson follows 
Shaftesbury in emphasising the importance of character development for reaching 
happiness. Thereby he shifts the focus of debates concerning liberty and the will. 
George Turnbull (1698–1748), like Hutcheson, emphasises the natural benevolence 
of human beings. Moreover Turnbull also builds on Shaftesbury’s philosophy.15 We can 
assume that as a member of the Rankenian Club—a society of intellectuals in Edinburgh, 
founded around 1716–17,—Turnbull had an opportunity to engage closely with 
Shaftesbury’s works and other new and radical ideas in politics and religion, and that these 
years shaped his intellectual development.16  
Hutcheson and Turnbull, following Shaftesbury, both agree on the importance of 
self-mastery and the cultivation of the right habits.17 However, the nuances of Turnbull’s 
project differ from Hutcheson’s. While freedom plays only a very limited role in Hutcheson’s 
philosophy, Turnbull understands freedom as self-mastery in The Principles of Moral and 
Christian Philosophy (2005 [1740]: I:58–70, 138–41). The differences can be explained if we 
take seriously Turnbull’s methodological approach and his larger philosophical project. 
																																																						
13 For further discussion, see Boeker (2018, 2019), Winkler (2000). 
14 For further discussion of Hutcheson’s intellectual debts to Shaftesbury, see Carey (2006, 
2015), Garrett and Heydt (2015), and Suderman (2015). 
15 See Broadie (2009: 108–11), Suderman (2015: 208). 
16 For further discussion, see Broadie (2009), Gomez Paris (2013), Stewart (1985), Wood 
(2004b), and The Scots Magazine (1771). 
17 Although Hutcheson and Turnbull hold many similar positions, they presumably 
developed their views independently of each other without much direct influence. 
According to Broadie (2005), the similarity of their views arises probably due to the fact 
that both were ‘educated in the same philosophical-theological canon’ (xiii). 
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Turnbull is the first philosopher in Scotland to apply the Newtonian experimental method 
to moral philosophy.18 He argues ‘that in order to bring moral philosophy … upon the same 
footing with natural philosophy … we must enquire into moral phenomena, in the same 
manner as we do into physical ones: that is, we must endeavor to find by experience the 
good general laws to which they are reducible.’ (2005 [1740]: I:56) Taking experience 
seriously, Turnbull asserts that there is no question that humans have liberty, by which he 
means that certain effects depend upon our will; ‘but how far it extends, is another question’ 
(2005 [1740]: I:58).19 He approaches moral philosophy like a science and argues that the 
moral world is governed by general laws just as the natural world. Thus, Turnbull’s aim is to 
show ‘that freedom, or power, as such, supposes, nay necessarily requires, in order to its 
subsistence and exercise, established general laws.’ (2005 [1740]: I:61, see also I:70) 
For Turnbull it is significant that freedom presupposes general laws, because they 
make it possible to have a ‘fixed way’ for obtaining goods and shunning away from pain 
(2005 [1740]: I:61). He argues that there is no doubt that humans have a ‘sphere of activity’ 
and that this sphere of activity must be governed by general law. It is important that humans 
understand their sphere of activity so that they are in a position to know how to regulate 
themselves (2005 [1740]: I:58–62). He writes: 
 
Whatever metaphysical janglings there have been about the freedom of our will; our 
moral dominion, liberty, and mastership of ourselves certainly consist in the 
established habit of thinking well before we act; insomuch as to be sure of ourselves, 
that no fancy or appetite shall be able to hurry us away into action, till reason and 
moral conscience have pronounced an impartial sentence about them. It is this 
command over ourselves, this empire over our passions, which enables us to put 
trust or confidence in ourselves, and renders us sure and trust-worthy in society to 
others. In it do true wisdom and freedom lie. (2005 [1740]: I:139) 
 
Turnbull further elaborates on our power to improve our understanding and to 
master ourselves in volume II of The Principles of Moral and Christian Philosophy, where he aims 
to show that divine providence is consistent with the liberty of moral agents—a view that he 
takes to be rooted in scripture (2005 [1740]: II:665–77). 
 
																																																						
18 See Garrett and Heydt (2015) and Wood (2004b). 
19 See also Turnbull (2005 [1740]: II:665–77). 
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The true liberty of a rational agent is placed by the holy scripture in his being able to 
govern all his appetites, and his whole conduct, by reason, with delight and 
complacency. It consists therefore in a just un-byassed judgment, and in a power of 
acting conformably to its dictates. Man therefore, in the scripture sense, is free, when 
his reason hath the place or authority due to it in his mind, and gives laws to all his 
appetites and choices. And he is then free, because he is master of himself; his better 
part rules, the guiding principle within him has the power and authority which of 
right belongs to it, and all the parts made to be ruled by it are under proper subjection 
to it. (2005 [1740]: II:666) 
 
Drawing on Locke’s Of the Conduct of the Understanding (1823: III:205–206), Turnbull 
argues that we are accountable for our understanding and capable of improvement. It is only 
after a bad act has been repeated several times that it starts to acquire ruling power. Thus we 
must take care to cultivate right habits and ‘it is by repeated acts that reason can alone acquire 
or preserve its rightful power and authority of governing.’ (Turnbull 2005 [1740]: II:669) 
However, do we really have a power to improve our understanding? Turnbull anticipates this 
worry and maintains that our power of self-mastery is beyond doubt once we consult our 
‘inward feeling and experience.’ (2005 [1740]: II:669) Again, it becomes clear that experience 
plays a major role in Turnbull’s philosophy. 
Although Turnbull grew up within the Calvinist tradition, his philosophical views are 
clearly distanced from the Calvinist view that humans are corrupted by sin.20 Rather as we 
have seen, he argues, like Hutcheson, and influenced by Locke and Shaftesbury, that our 
important task is to become masters of ourselves, which for Turnbull is true liberty.  
 
 
III David Hume on human agency and moral responsibility 
 
David Hume (1711–1776), like Turnbull, adopts the experimental method, as he makes 
explicit in the subtitle of his first major work A Treatise of Human Nature: Being an Attempt to 
Introduce the Experimental Method of Reasoning into Moral Subject (2007 [1739–40], 1978 [1739–
40]). However, in contrast to Turnbull, Hume is more cautious to infer metaphysical 
conclusions from psychologically given phenomena. Hume often takes an agnostic, or even 
																																																						
20 For further discussion, see Suderman (2015). 
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sceptical stance, on questions that his predecessors treated as metaphysical problems.21 This 
section focuses, first, on Hume’s treatment of human agency and the will and then turns to 
his views on liberty, necessity, and moral responsibility. Since we find a more detailed and 
advanced discussion of human agency in his Enquiry concerning Human Understanding (2000 
[1748], 1975), it will be my main source, but I will additionally draw on the Treatise, where 
helpful.22 
How, according to Hume, can we understand the relation between the will and 
subsequent action? Hume argues that we are conscious that our volitions lead to bodily 
movements as a matter of common experience. ‘But the means, by which this is effected; 
the energy, by which the will performs so extraordinary an operation; of this we are so far 
from being immediately conscious, that it must for ever escape our most diligent enquiry.’ 
(2000 [1748], 1975: 7.10, SBN 65)  
The context of Hume’s discussion in section 7 of the Enquiry concerning Human 
Understanding is an examination of our idea of power or necessary connection. Having shown 
that we neither acquire the idea of power or necessary connection by reason nor by observing 
interaction among external objects, Hume turns to the question of ‘whether this idea be 
derived from reflection on the operations of our own minds, and be copied from any internal 
impression.’ (2000 [1748], 1975: 7.7, SBN 64) In particular, he considers whether the idea of 
power is derived from our internal consciousness of volitions that lead to bodily movements. 
Applying his copy principle,23 Hume concludes that it is not (2000 [1748], 1975: 7.15–16, 
SBN 67). Consequently, our idea of power or necessary connection is unintelligible. To reach 
this conclusion he argues both for the separability of volition and action and for the 
incomprehensibility of the supposed causal mechanism between volition and action.24  
Hume argues that causes and effects are two distinct objects or events. Similarly, he 
argues that volition is separate from action. To support this point he presents an example of 
a man with paralysed limbs who has the volition to move his limbs, but is unable to do so 
(2000 [1748], 1975: 7.13, SBN 66). This shows that there can be volition without action. 
																																																						
21 For example, see Harris (2005). 
22 As Wood (2014: 88–90) argues, Hume started to develop his views on human agency 
when he wrote the Abstract and the Appendix of the Treatise in 1740, but the Enquiry 
concerning Human Understanding presents his most advanced views on the topic.  
23 Hume introduces the copy principles in Treatise 1.1.1 and Enquiry concerning Human 
Understanding, section 2.  
24 For a detailed discussion of Hume’s separability and incomprehensibility arguments, see 
Wood (2014). 
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Moreover, even in the ordinary case where one is able to move one’s limbs, volition 
does not immediately lead to bodily motion. For instance, if I have a volition to stretch my leg, 
my volition does not immediately result in the movement of my leg, but rather, Hume argues, 
anatomy shows that it is successively mediated by ‘certain muscles, and nerves, and animal 
spirits, and, perhaps, something still more minute and more unknown.’ (2000 [1748], 1975: 
7.14, SBN 66) 
Hume further supports his view that we are not entitled to form a belief in the 
necessary connection between volition and action by arguing repeatedly that the supposed 
causal mechanism is incomprehensible. He maintains that when we know a power we must 
‘know both the cause and effect, and the relation between them.’ (2000 [1748], 1975: 7.17, 
SBN 68) However, we understand very little about the nature of the human mind and how 
it interacts with the body. In another argument Hume points out that the command of the 
will over mind and body is limited and that ‘these limits are not known by reason or any 
acquaintance with the nature of cause and effect; but only by experience and observation, as 
in all other natural events and in the operation of external objects.’ (2000 [1748], 1975: 7.18, 
SBN 68) Thus, for Hume experience is our only guide for examining how the will influences 
our action. However, experience does not provide us with any notion of necessary 
connection or power, but only teaches us how certain actions constantly follows certain 
volitions, or more generally how one event constantly follows another. 
How novel are Hume’s arguments? The claim that volition and action are separate is 
not unique to Hume, but rather, as Joshua Wood (Wood 2014: 98–101) has shown, it is 
widely held by Hume’s predecessors and contemporaries, among them Descartes,25 Locke,26 
and Andrew Baxter.27 It can also be found in the works of Scottish philosophers, who 
objected to other aspects of Hume’s philosophy. For instance, Thomas Reid in his Essays on 
the Active Powers of Man (2010 [1788]) defines action as the exertion of active power (I.1, 13) 
and distinguishes power from its exertion. He writes: ‘It is true, there can be no exertion 
without power; but there may be power that is not exerted.’ (I.1, 11) In a letter to Kames, 
dated 6 October 1780, Reid is even more explicit and illustrates the distinction between 
volition and action, like Hume, with a paralysis example:  
 
																																																						
25 See Descartes (1984–1991: I:315). 
26 See Locke (1976–1989: VII:404). 
27 See Baxter (1733: 69). 
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I think, my Lord, there is an Act of the Mind which I call Volition that preceeds the 
external Action & is the Cause of it; though in most Cases we attend chiefly to the 
Effect. I shall put a Case in which they are easily distinguished. I will, to stretch out 
my Arm; but by a stroke of Palsy, which I was not aware of, I have lost the Power. 
Here I am conscious of an Exertion, yet there is no external Action. I repeat this 
Exertion, I make a strong Effort; but all in vain. No Motion follows. There is surely 
a difference between trying to extend my Arm, & doing nothing. This trial is a 
Volition. (2002: 130) 
 
Reid makes a similar point in a manuscript, titled ‘Of Power’, where he invites us to compare 
the volition to walk immediately with the volition to walk an hour later. While in the former 
case volition and exertion seem inseparably conjoined, in the latter case volition and exertion 
are disjoined and thus Reid infers that they are different (Reid and Haldane 2001 [1792]: 5). 
Although the view that volition and the exertion of action are separate is widely held, 
a notable exception within the Scottish tradition can be found in the works of Mary Shepherd 
(1777–1847). Shepherd endorses the simultaneity of causes and effects and argues that 
effects are contained in causes. Thereby she opposes Hume’s view that causes and effects 
are distinct objects or events (Shepherd 1824, 2020 [1827]). 
Hume’s view that the supposed causal mechanism between volition and action is 
incomprehensible is also widely accepted by seventeenth and eighteenth century thinkers 
(Wood 2014: 107–108). For instance, Hutcheson in An Enquiry into the Original of Beauty and 
Virtue (2004 [1725]) regards it as ‘mysterious’ how ‘the Act of Volition should move Flesh 
and Bones’ (180). Although Reid is not as sceptical as Hume about powers, he too 
acknowledges that humans have limited understanding of the production of action and 
writes: ‘So we, knowing that certain effects depend on our will, impute to ourselves the power 
of producing them, though there may be some latent processes between the volition and the 
production which we do not know.’ (Reid and Haldane 2001 [1792]: 8)28 In the same vein, 
Dugald Stewart writes:  
 
It is scarely necessary for me to observe, that we are altogether ignorant of the 
connexion between the volitions of the mind and the consequent actions. We will 
the end, and it is accomplished in a way inexplicable to us. (1854–1860: VI:347) 
 
																																																						
28 See also Reid (1995) and Wood (1995). 
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Hume’s new contribution lies in the application of the copy principle and in his 
psychological explanation for how we form beliefs in necessary connections. Since we cannot 
find an impression from which our idea of power or necessary connection is derived, he 
regards our idea of power or necessary connection as meaningless. As a consequence, he 
proposes to alter our definitions of cause (2000 [1748], 1975: 7.29, SBN 76–77)29 and 
necessity (2000 [1748], 1975: 8.27, SBN 97).30 For present purposes, it will be sufficient to 
consider the latter:  
 
Necessity may be defined two ways, conformably to the two definitions of cause, of 
which it makes an essential part. It consists either in the constant conjunction of like 
objects, or in the inference of the understanding from one object to another. (2000 
[1748], 1975: 8.3, SBN 81) 
 
Hume’s new definition of necessity is at the heart of his attempt to settle the 
longstanding disputes about liberty and necessity. For Hume the entire controversy is merely 
verbal and arises due to ill-defined terms. Section 8 of the Enquiry concerning Human 
Understanding aims to establish that once we adopt his definitions of necessity and liberty, it 
will become clear that liberty and necessity can be reconciled and ‘that all men have ever 
agreed in the doctrine both of necessity and of liberty’ (2000 [1748], 1975: 8.3, SBN 81).31  
Liberty, according to Hume, consists in ‘a power of acting or not acting, according to the 
determinations of the will; that is, if we choose to remain at rest, we may; if we choose to move, 
we also may.’ (2000 [1748], 1975: 8.23, SBN 95). Although Hume presents his definition of 
liberty as uncontroversial, it does not satisfy defenders of libertarian free will, who are not 
only interested in the question of whether we are free to act, but additionally raise the 
question of whether our will itself is free. As we will see in section V, James Beattie, Thomas 
Reid, and Dugald Stewart critique Hume’s view on such grounds.  
Let us consider how Hume’s conceptions of liberty and necessity inform his 
approach to questions of moral responsibility. First, it is worth noting that he not only argues 
that liberty and necessity can be reconciled, but rather he makes the stronger claim that liberty 
presupposes necessity (2000 [1748], 1975: 8.23–25; SBN 95–96). Otherwise, if liberty was 
																																																						
29 Cf. Hume (2007 [1739–40], 1978 [1739–40]: 1.3.14.31, SBN 169–70). 
30 Cf. Hume (2007 [1739–40], 1978 [1739–40]: 2.3.2.4, SBN 409). 
31 For a more detailed discussion, see e.g. Garrett (1997: ch. 6), Harris (2005: ch. 4). 
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‘opposed to necessity, not to constraint,’ it would be ‘the same thing with chance’ (2000 
[1748], 1975: 8.25, SBN 96). 
For Hume, moral responsibility presupposes both liberty and necessity (2000 [1748], 
1975: 8.26, 28–31; SBN 96–99). Liberty is required, because actions that are not done in 
accordance with one’s will and arise from external violence are not proper objects of moral 
praise or blame. It may be tempting to assume that moral responsibility presupposes 
necessity, because there must be a causal connection between the agent and the action that 
results from it. This means that the agent must have caused the action. However, this 
interpretation rests on the presence of necessary connections between an agent and the 
action and cannot easily be reconciled with Hume’s new definitions of cause and necessity.32 
To better understand in what sense necessity is presupposed, the following passage is 
insightful:  
 
The only proper object of hatred or vengeance, is a person or creature, endowed with 
thought and consciousness; and when any criminal or injurious actions excite that 
passion, it is only by their relation to the person, or connexion with him. Actions are, 
by their very nature, temporary and perishing; and where they proceed not from 
some cause in the character and disposition of the person who performed them, they 
can neither redound to his honour, if good; nor infamy, if evil. The actions 
themselves may be blameable; they may be contrary to all the rules of morality and 
religion: But the person is not answerable for them; and as they proceeded from 
nothing in him, that is durable and constant, and leave nothing of that nature behind 
them, it is impossible he can, upon their account, become the object of punishment 
or vengeance. According to the principle, therefore, which denies necessity, and 
consequently causes, a man is as pure and untainted, after having committed the most 
horrid crime, as at the first moment of his birth, nor is his character any wise 
concerned in his actions; since they are not derived from it, and the wickedness of 
the one can never be used as a proof of the depravity of the other. (2000 [1748], 
1975: 8.29, SBN 98)33 
 
Here Hume emphasises that a person is only answerable for actions if they arise from 
stable character traits. To analyse Hume’s understanding of moral responsibility and the role 
																																																						
32 On this point I am in agreement with Russell (2008: 234). 
33 Cf. Hume (2007 [1739–40], 1978 [1739–40]: 2.3.2.6, SBN 411). 
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that necessity plays within it, it is helpful to distinguish two interrelated issues: The first 
concerns the causal relation between character traits and actions; the second concerns the 
role of the indirect passions in producing feelings of approval and disapproval directed at 
the self or another person upon the presence of certain character traits.34 
As regards the former, Hume regards character traits as mental qualities. They are 
causes of actions, but the mere possession of a certain character trait does not automatically 
lead to the production of the action. For instance, a person may possess the character trait 
of generosity, but if she does not find herself in situations where she can be generous this 
character trait may not manifest itself in actions. Thus character traits can be understood as 
dispositions.35 It remains to ask in what sense character traits cause actions. Since actions 
require an influencing motive for Hume and since motives involve passions (2007 [1739–
40], 1978 [1739–40]: 2.3.3), character traits will involve passions. In light of the dispositional 
nature of character traits, actions will only be produced when a person is in a particular 
situation. Frykholm (2012) proposes that ‘how she acts in that situation depends on which 
passions motivate her; which passions motivate her are (often) determined by which ideas 
and beliefs are called to mind for her most vividly in this situation; and which ideas and 
beliefs are vividly called to mind depends on the associations of ideas she has, as built upon 
her past experience, her habits, her education, etc.’ (92) The advantage of Frykholm’s 
interpretation is that it is consistent with Hume’s new definitions of causation and necessity 
and his larger philosophical project. Thus the causal relation between character traits and 
actions is best understood in terms of constant conjunction, which are grounded in habit, 
education, and one’s association of ideas. This reading can nicely accommodate Hume’s 
second definition, because habit leads our mind to infer one object upon the presence of 
another. On this basis, we can take seriously both Hume’s claim that moral responsibility 
arises only for actions that arise from stable character traits and his claim that moral 
responsibility presupposes necessity. Moreover, this reading reveals the continuities with 
Hutcheson’s and Turnbull’s philosophical views. 
Nevertheless, Hume’s views on character traits and moral responsibility are clearly 
embedded in his own philosophical system. His discussion of the causal relation between 
character traits and actions is closely linked with his theory of the indirect passions. The 
indirect passions pride and humility, love and hatred, which are the main focus of Hume’s 
																																																						
34 While I agree with Russell (1995: ch. 4, 2008: 234–35) that the indirect passions play an 
important role in Hume’s account of moral responsibility, I diverge from Russell by 
distinguishing these two issues. 
35 For further discussion, see Frykholm (2012). 
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discussion of the indirect passions in Treatise 2.1–2, are governed by psychological 
mechanisms. Character traits can be causes of pleasure and pain, which in turn give rise to 
the indirect passions pride or love, if the feeling is pleasant, and humility or hatred, if the 
feeling is painful. Pride and humility are directed towards self, and love and hatred towards 
another person. Thereby character traits become subject of approval and disapproval. Hume 
does not discuss the details of his account of the indirect passions in the Enquiry concerning 
Human Understanding. Yet in the first sentence of paragraph 8.29—the passage cited above—
Hume distinguishes the cause of hatred, namely criminal or injurious actions from the object, 
namely a person, to which the cause is related. This intimates that his account of the indirect 
passions and the psychological mechanisms that govern them is still present in the second 
Enquiry. I will return to Hume’s account of the passions in section VI.  
 
 
IV Kames’s defence of necessity  
 
Henry Home, Lord Kames (1696–1782) is unwilling to accept Hume’s view that our belief 
in necessary connection arises due to a customary act of the imagination. In Part II, Essay V 
of his Essays on the Principles of Morality and Natural Religion (2005 [1779]) Kames admits that 
we cannot acquire the idea of power through experience. Experience can inform us that 
certain objects are constantly conjoined, but ‘such conjunction is far from being the same 
with the idea of power.’ (2005 [1779]: 185) According to Kames, ‘[p]ower is a simple idea, 
and therefore incapable of being defined; but no person can be at a loss about it; for it is 
suggested to the mind by every external action.’ (2005 [1779]: 185) 
According to Kames, Hume’s view is inconsistent with common sense and his 
strategy is to show that Hume’s arguments concerning the origin of our idea of power and 
necessary connection fail, because they presuppose the reality of power (2005 [1779]: 186–
89). Hume considers, for example, ‘a power or quality in bread to nourish; a power by which 
bodies preserve in motion.’ (Kames 2005 [1779]: 189) For Kames this shows that Hume not 
only acknowledges that we have an idea of power, but also ‘the reality of this power.’ (Kames 
2005 [1779]: 189) 
Kames is committed to the principle that ‘nothing can happen without a cause’ (2005 
[1779]: 97).36 Consequently, everything, including human action, is necessitated by prior 
causes. For Kames it is necessary that a motive precedes an action. In contrast to Hume, 
																																																						
36 See also Kames (2005 [1779]: 110–11, 118, 122–23). 
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who explains the causal relation between motive and action in terms of regular conjunctions, 
it is not relevant for Kames that there is a regular conjunction between motives and actions, 
but rather he holds that the prevailing motive causes the action. Indeed, for Kames it is 
possible that motives that have not previously influenced actions or are irrational to choose 
can become causes of actions: 
 
It is true, that, in debating upon human liberty, a man may attempt to show that 
motives have no necessary influence, by eating perhaps the worst apple that is before 
him, or, in some such trifling matter, preferring an obviously less good to a greater. 
But is it not plain, that the humor of showing that he can act against motives, is the 
very motive of the whimsical preference? (2005 [1779]: 102) 
 
Kames’s Essays on the Principles of Morality and Natural Religion was first published in 
1751, a revised second edition that included major revisions of the Essay ‘Of Liberty and 
Necessity’ (Part I, Essay III) appeared in 1758, and a third editions that contained further 
revisions in 1779. Throughout all three editions Kames is committed to the view that 
everything is governed by necessity, but his understanding of liberty changes.37 While Kames 
regards our feeling of liberty as a delusion in the first edition (1751), he steps back from this 
view in later editions and acknowledges that human freedom is compatible with necessity. 
In the third edition he writes: 
 
Man is a free agent, because he acts according to his own will. He is at the same time 
a necessary agent, because his will is necessarily influenced by motives. These are 
perfectly consistent. The laws of action which respect the human mind, are as fixed 
as those which respect matter. (2005 [1779]: 103–104) 
 
In the following, I focus on Kames’s views concerning human agency and moral 
accountability in the third edition of 1779. To establish that human actions are both necessary 
and voluntary, Kames’s distinction between moral necessity and physical necessity is crucial 
																																																						
37 For a detailed analysis of the changes that Kames made, see Harris (2005: ch. 5). See also 
Broadie (2009: 273–80), Ross (1972, 2000). Besides philosophical criticism Kames was 
threatened to be excommunicated from the kirk of Scotland and at risk of losing his 
position as a judge of the Court of Session. The social pressure he was exposed may have 
contributed to his willingness to revise the first edition.  
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(2005 [1779]: 105–106).38 Humans are passive when under the influence of physical causes, 
but under the influence of moral causes they act themselves. Moral causes, in contrast to 
physical causes, act by ‘solicitation and persuasion’ (2005 [1779]: 106) rather than force. The 
action ‘is directed by the will, and is in the strictest sense voluntary.’ (2005 [1779]: 106) 
Nevertheless, it is also necessary, because as a matter of human constitution ‘desire always 
determines the will.’(2005 [1779]: 106) Kames believes that his view that humans are 
necessary agents has been widely ignored, because many fail to realise that moral necessity 
differs from physical necessity and fail to distinguish necessity from constraint. For Kames, 
liberty is opposed to constraint, but not to necessity (2005 [1779]: 104–107, 117). 
Kames anticipates that critics may worry that his system of voluntary necessity does 
not leave room for moral accountability, praise and blame. How could someone be held 
accountable who necessarily acts upon evil motives? In response to this variant of the 
traditional theological problem of evil, Kames rejects the traditional free will defence (2005 
[1779]: 107–108).39 He equates liberty of indifference with chance or arbitrariness and claims 
that it would not leave scope for rational or moral government, because a person who is free 
in this sense would act independently of motives; indeed, contrary to traditional assumptions, 
freedom of indifference would turn one into ‘a most bizzare and unaccountable being’ (2005 
[1779]: 108).  
For Kames virtue and vice have their foundation in human nature. ‘[A]n action is 
always approved when it proceeds from a virtuous motive … On the other hand, an action 
is disapproved when it proceeds from a vitious motive.’ (2005 [1779]: 114–15) Both virtue 
and vice come in degrees and are proportional to the strength of the motive. Kames observes 
that we are constituted in such a way that we ‘blame ourselves, even when we have the 
clearest conviction of inability to behave better.’ (2005 [1779]: 115) Kames simply accepts 
that some humans are by nature virtuous and thus deserve reward, while others are by nature 
vicious and therefore guilty and deserve punishment (2005 [1779]: 115). It is our own 
conscience that makes us accountable for actions that we perform in accordance with our 
will (2005 [1779]: 117). For Kames there is no need to postulate liberty of indifference. To 
illustrate this point, he assumes that a criminal had been free to act otherwise. Now the 
question arises as to why the criminal did not act otherwise, but rather acted upon the vicious 
motive. The answer, Kames argues, is that the criminal has a bad disposition and deserves 
punishment. His strategy is to show that a defender of liberty of indifference ultimately offers 
																																																						
38 This distinction is already present in the first edition, but is refined in later editions. 
39 For further discussion, see Ross (2000). 
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the same answer as he does. Hence, Kames regards liberty of indifference as superfluous, let 
alone incomprehensible, and concludes that his system, by contrast, is perfectly consistent 
with morality (2005 [1779]: 116).40  
 
 
V Common sense, free will and the role of motives in James Beattie, Thomas Reid 
and Dugald Stewart 
 
The Scottish common sense philosophers Thomas Reid (1710–1796), James Beattie (1735–
1803), and Dugald Stewart (1753–1828) all oppose the doctrine of necessity. In 1751 Reid 
was appointed as regent at King’s College, Aberdeen, and became Adam Smith’s successor 
as professor of moral philosophy at the University of Glasgow in 1764.41 Beattie was 
professor of moral philosophy and logic at Marischal College, Aberdeen. Although Reid and 
Beattie worked at different colleges, they were both actively involved in the Aberdeen 
Philosophical Society—a society that Reid founded in 1758. Stewart was educated at the 
University of Edinburgh and upon Ferguson’s suggestion attended Reid’s lectures at the 
University of Glasgow in 1771–72. In 1772 Stewart started teaching at the University of 
Edinburgh and in 1785 he succeeded Ferguson as professor of moral philosophy at 
Edinburgh.42 
All three believe that acting in accordance with one’s will is not sufficient for 
freedom, but rather they emphasise that our will itself must be free. They argue that this 
libertarian account of free will is grounded in common sense.  
Beattie in his Essay on the Nature and Immutability of Truth (1771 [1770]) opposes 
Hume’s account of power. For Beattie ‘[c]ausation implies more than priority and contiguity 
of the cause to the effect.’ (333) Rather, in order to conceive the relation of cause and effect, 
one has to suppose power or energy in the cause. He holds that our own consciousness of 
power or energy when we contemplate two causally related things is sufficient to establish 
that we have an idea or conception of power (1771 [1770]: 333–34). 
Moreover, Beattie opposes Kames’s necessitarianism, which he equates with fatalism 
(Beattie 1771 [1770]: 366–67). Beattie does not see the need to engage closely with Kames’s 
arguments, but rather he regards it as evident that humans have free agency and writes that 
																																																						
40 For further discussion, see also Kames (2007 [1774]: 744–56). 
41 For further details, see Wood (2004a). 
42 See Brown (2004). 
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he has been unable to doubt his own free agency (1771 [1770]: 367–68). In his later work 
Elements of Moral Science (1790) Beattie equates freedom with the ability to act, which leads 
him to reject the notion of necessary agency as a contradiction in terms; just as contradictory 
as the notion of a free slave (197). 
Beattie’s position elicits his moral and religious concerns.43 In contrast to the doctrine 
of necessity, he sees the doctrine liberty as ‘perfectly consistent with religion, conscience, and 
common sense.’ (1771 [1770]: 384) According to Beattie, freedom understood as self-
determination is a prerequisite for morality: 
 
Unless some events depend upon my determination, ought, and ought not, have no 
meaning when applied to me. Moral agency further implies, that we are accountable 
for our conduct; and that if we do what we ought not to do, we deserve blame and 
punishment. My conscience tells me, that I am accountable for those actions only 
that are in my own power; and neither blames nor approves, in myself or in others, 
that conduct which is the effect, not of choice, but of necessity. (1771 [1770]: 388) 
 
As we have seen, Beattie rejects the doctrine of necessity by taking consciousness of 
our own freedom as authoritative. Although Reid and Stewart, like Beattie, oppose necessity 
and instead endorse libertarian free will, Reid and Stewart do not merely appeal to 
consciousness, since both accept that the exact connection between volition and action is 
incomprehensible and acknowledge the limitation of human understanding as well as the 
difficulties with attempts to establish free agency by appeal to consciousness (Stewart 1854–
1860: VI: 347, 351, 382–90). Both engage more closely with their opponents than Beattie, 
and Reid, in particular, offers detailed arguments for liberty (Reid 2010 [1788]: IV).44 I do 
not have the space to engage closely with all of Reid’s arguments for liberty here. Instead I 
focus on the role of motives in both Reid’s and Stewart’s philosophy. I will begin with 
Stewart and then turn to Reid’s distinction between animal and rational motives. 
Stewart intends to show that voluntary agency is not analogous to relations of cause 
and effect in the external world. Stewart accuses Hobbes of giving too much weight to 
motives by replacing the traditional distinction between the understanding and the will with 
the new names ‘Cognitive powers’ and ‘Motive powers’ respectively (Stewart 1854–1860: 
																																																						
43 For further discussion, see Harris (2005: ch. 6). 
44 For further discussion of the differences between Beattie and Reid, see Harris (2005: 
147–48). For detailed discussions of Reid’s arguments for liberty, see Harris (2005: ch. 8), 
Rowe (1991), Yaffe (2004). 
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VI:349). Once the will is understood in terms of motive powers it becomes trivial to establish 
that the will is determined by motive powers, which provides the ground for the doctrine of 
necessity. Rather than claiming that motives necessarily determine actions, Stewart 
emphasises that we have to realise that voluntary agents have a power of self-determination; 
thereby they are authors of their actions (1854–1860: VI:351–52). 
 
The argument for Necessity derives all its force from the maxim, “that every change 
requires a cause.” But this maxim, although true with respect to inanimate matter, does 
not apply to intelligent agents, which cannot be conceived without the power of self-
determination. Upon an accurate analysis, indeed, of the meaning of words, it will be 
found that the idea of an efficient cause implies the idea of mind, and consequently, that 
it is absurd to ascribe the volitions of mind to the efficiency of causes foreign to itself. 
(1854–1860: VI:352) 
 
Reid also challenges the necessitarian view that every action must have a motive 
(2010 [1788]: IV.4, 213). He accepts that motives influence actions, but rejects that they cause 
or necessitate them (2010 [1788]: IV.4, 214). He sees the role of a motive as analogous to 
giving advice. ‘For in vain is advice given when there is not a power either to do, or to forbear 
what it recommends. In like manner, motives suppose liberty in the agent, otherwise they 
have no influence at all.’ (2010 [1788]: IV.4, 214) 
Reid, in contrast to Hume and Kames, argues that it is ‘unreasonable to conclude, 
That if men are not necessarily determined by motives, rewards and punishments would have 
no effect.’ (2010 [1788]: IV.4, 220) Reid understands the doctrine of necessity in mechanist 
terms. For him it does not make sense to reward or punish humans for effects that are 
produced mechanically, because reward and punishment ‘imply good and ill desert.’ (2010 
[1788]: IV.4, 221) In such circumstances a fault can only be attributed to the lawgiver, but 
not to the individual governed by the laws of necessity. Thus, Reid concludes that reward 
and punishment presuppose liberty: 
 
Upon the supposition of liberty, rewards and punishments will have a proper effect 
upon the wise and the good; but not upon the foolish and the vicious, when opposed 
by their animal passions or bad habits; and this is just what we see to be the fact. 
Upon this supposition the transgression of the law implies no defect in the law, no 
fault in the lawgiver; the fault is solely in the transgressor. And it is upon this 
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supposition only, that there can be either reward or punishment, in the proper sense 
of the words, because it is only on this supposition, that there can be good or ill 
desert. (2010 [1788]: IV.4, 221) 
 
Reid distinguishes two types of motives, namely animal and rational motives. The 
former are motives that humans have in common with non-human animals, while ‘the latter 
are peculiar to rational beings.’ (2010 [1788]: IV.4, 218) While non-human animals act upon 
the strongest animal motive, rational beings have a degree of self-command which enables 
them to resist animal motives and exercise their rational powers. Reid characterises rational 
motives as follows: 
 
They do not give a blind impulse to the will as animal motives do. They convince, 
but they do not impel, unless, as may often happen, they excite some passion of 
hope, or fear, or desire. Such passions may be excited by conviction, and may operate 
in its aid as other animal motives do. But there may be conviction without passion; 
and the conviction of what we ought to do, in order to some end which we have 
judged fit to be pursued, is what I call a rational motive. (2010 [1788]: IV.4, 219) 
 
Rational motives presuppose conceptions of ought and ought not, which animals lack 
(2010 [1788]: IV.4, 219). Reid does not assume that rational motives are an innate part of the 
constitution of rational beings. Indeed, he is explicit that children gradually acquire 
conceptions of ought and ought not ‘as their rational powers advance.’ (2010 [1788]: IV.4, 219) 
Thus as children grow up and their rational capacities develop they gradually learn to act in 
accordance with rational motives and to resist the impulse of animal motives. 
Reid’s distinction between animal and rational motives is integrated into his system 
of the principles of actions, which he divides into mechanical, animal, and rational principles 
of action (2010 [1788]: III). Reid’s principles of actions concern ‘every thing that incites us 
to act.’ (2010 [1788]: III.i.1, 74) This means principles of actions are not restricted to the 
determining ground of actions, but rather include anything that influences or motivates 
actions. According to him, instinct and habit belong to the mechanical principles of action, 
appetites, desires, benevolent and malevolent affections to the animal principles of action, 
and regard to duty as a whole and conscience—or a sense of duty, or moral sense, as Reid 
also calls it—are rational principles of action. Rational principles make us capable of moral 
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or political government (2010 [1788]: III.iii.5, 168).45 At the same time he acknowledges that 
animal principles are part of our human constitution. Reason and virtue are often weak, or 
only reach maturity at a late stage in life, and thus insufficient for the preservation of the 
human species. ‘Therefore the wise Author of our being hath implanted in human nature 
many inferior principles of action’ (2010 [1788]: III.ii.3, 106).  
Given that the rational principles of actions are not yet properly developed at a young 
age, how do we become virtuous moral agents, according to Reid? Appetites govern many 
actions of non-human animals, but humans are capable of desires that set them apart from 
animals such as the desire for esteem or knowledge . These desires ‘are not only highly useful 
in society, and in their nature more noble than our appetites, they are likewise the most 
proper engines that can be used in the education and discipline of men.’(2010 [1788]: III.ii.2, 
103). For Reid animal principles play an important role in education and are relevant for 
showing us the path to becoming virtuous moral agents.46  
 
 
VI Hume, Smith, and Reid on the passions and sympathy 
 
It may be worth reflecting further on Reid’s distinction between animal and rational 
principles of actions and to contrast his view with Hume’s and Smith’s philosophical views. 
To recall, Reid’s list of animal principles includes appetites, desires, and benevolent and 
malevolent affections. It may seem surprising that Reid does not include passions on this list. 
However, this is not an oversight on Reid’s part, but rather he believes that Hume has given 
the term ‘passion’ a far too extensive meaning: 
 
Mr Hume gives the name passion to every principle of action in the human mind; and 
in consequence of this maintains, that every man is, and ought to be led by his 
passions, and that the use of reason is to be subservient to the passions. (Reid 2010 
[1788]: III.ii.6, 135)  
 
Reid’s aim is to take common usage in ordinary language seriously, which supports 
that the term ‘passion’ should be used in a more restricted sense than Hume does (2010 
																																																						
45 See also Reid (2010 [1788]: IV.5). 
46 For two different ways of explaining the importance of animal motives in moral 
development, see Folescu (2018) and Kroeker (2011). 
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[1788]: III.ii.6, 136). After Reid has introduced appetites, desires, and affections as animal 
principles of actions, his discussion turns to the passions. However, Reid does not regard 
passions as a principle of action distinct from desires and affection, but rather ordinary 
language supports that the word ‘passion’ denotes ‘a degree of vehemence’ (2010 
[1788:III.ii.6, 136) in desires or affections, which produces sensible effects upon the body 
such as change of voice or gesture, as well as sensible effects upon the mind such as biased 
judgement or preoccupation of the mind with certain issues (2010 [1788]: III.ii.6, 134–36).  
Reid does not deny that passions are an important part of human nature. Indeed, he 
claims that ‘[t]he passions, when kept within their proper bounds, give life and vigour to the 
whole man. Without them man would be a slug.’ (2010 [1788]: III.ii.6, 141–142) 
Nevertheless, there is also no doubt that Reid aims to keep passions ‘within their proper 
bounds’ and believes that genuine moral agency cannot be understood solely in terms of 
animals principles or the passions.  
A defender of Hume’s philosophy may wonder whether Reid has overlooked the 
powerful resources that a sophisticated account of the passions, like Hume’s, can offer. In 
particular, Hume would argue that passions do not need to be regulated by reason, but rather 
passions can be regulated both by ourselves and by others when we interact sympathetically. 
This makes it worth examining whether sympathy can play the same role that rational 
principles play in Reid’s philosophy. Before I engage more closely with Hume’s and Smith’s 
accounts of sympathy, I want to acknowledge that Reid would be critical about such an 
attempt, because Reid regards Humean sympathy as an involuntary response, which belongs 
to the part of human nature that we share with animals. Instead Reid believes that genuine 
moral agency presupposes libertarian free will. Reid’s criticism of Hume’s view finds clear 
expression in the following passage:  
 
In this system [i.e. Hume’s], the proper object of moral approbation is not action or 
any voluntary exertion, but qualities of mind; that is, natural affections or passions, 
which are involuntary, a part of the constitution of the man, and common to us with 
many brute-animals. When we praise or blame any voluntary action, it is only 
considered as a sign of the natural affection from which it flows, and from which all 
its merit and demerit is derived. (2010 [1788]: V.5, 301)  
 
Reid’s criticism assumes that sympathetic responses, and passions more generally, are 
involuntary responses outside our control.  
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Hume’s account of the passions is more nuanced and sophisticated than Reid 
portrays it. For Hume there is scope to regulate passions, but—contrary to other 
philosophers such as Reid—he believes that we regulate passions by passions rather than by 
reason (Hume 2007 [1739–40], 1978 [1739–40]: 2.3.3–4, SBN 413–22).47 Following 
Hutcheson (2002 [1728]), Hume distinguishes between calm and violent passions and 
accuses philosophers who hold that actions are governed by reason of confounding calm 
passions with reason (2007 [1739–40], 1978 [1739–40]: 2.3.3.8, SBN 417). According to 
Hume, we are in a position to self-regulate passions. For example, by developing strength of 
mind the calm passions gain prevalence over the violent passions (2007 [1739–40], 1978 
[1739–40]: 2.3.3.10, SBN 418). If one repeatedly does actions that tend towards long-term 
good, one can cultivate inclinations towards these types of actions and they become habitual. 
The cultivation of good habits can be further assisted by the imagination, because the 
imagination makes it possible to vividly picture consequences and long-term benefits or 
harms of actions. Thus custom and repetition, assisted by the imagination, are powerful 
principles that enable us to acquire strength of mind (2007 [1739–40], 1978 [1739–40]: 2.3.5–
6, SBN 422–27).48 
Although individuals can self-regulate their passions, for Hume government of the 
passions is not solely the task of individuals, but rather is to a large extent a social 
phenomenon. Sympathetic interaction with others in society alters, regulates, and refines 
passions and contributes to the development of stable character traits.49 As Hume writes, 
‘[o]ur reputation, our character, our name are considerations of vast weight and importance; 
and even the other causes of pride; virtue, beauty and riches; have little influence, when not 
seconded by the opinions and sentiments of others.’ (2007 [1739–40], 1978 [1739–40]: 
2.1.11.1, SBN 316) The psychological mechanism of sympathy, as Hume understands it, 
enables us to enter into the feelings of others (2007 [1739–40]: 2.1.11, 2.2.5, 2.2.9, 3.3.1). 
When I sympathise with another person, I first have a lively idea of the other person’s 
interests, passions, pleasures or pains, which is then converted into an impression. Thereby 
I start to mirror the feelings of the other person and make them my own. In this way, my 
social circles shape my passions.50 
Let us return to Reid’s criticism. His objection that passions are involuntary 
responses overlooks that for Hume passions can be self-regulated and are altered and 
																																																						
47 For more detailed discussion, see Radcliffe (2018: ch. 6). 
48 See also Radcliffe (2018: 171–72). 
49 For further discussion, see Harris (2013), Radcliffe (2018: 174–75), Waldow (2014). 
50 For further discussion, see Taylor (2015). 
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regulated by sympathy. Yet Reid’s concern can be reformulated as the worry whether Hume’s 
view leaves adequate scope for correcting and critiquing social circles and their practices of 
approving and disapproving certain sets of character traits. Reid, as a defender of libertarian 
free will, would not be satisfied by Hume’s view, because from Reid’s perspective it does not 
leave adequate scope for self-determination and genuine authorship of actions. 
At this stage, it is worth contrasting Hume’s account of sympathy with the views of 
his contemporary Adam Smith (1723–1790). Smith’s notion of sympathy is intimately tied 
to the concept of an impartial spectator. Sympathy for Smith involves an act of the 
imagination whereby one enters the perspective of an impartial spectator and considers what 
feelings an impartial spectator would have in the given situation (1982 [1759]). His account 
of sympathy is normative right from the opening chapters of The Theory of Moral Sentiments. 
In contrast to Hume, who starts with the idea of the feelings of another person, which is 
then converted into an impression and a feeling of one’s own, Smith by entering the stance 
of the impartial spectator asks what feelings it would be appropriate to have. The feelings of 
the spectator do not have to match the feelings of the agent and this gap provides space for 
the correction of sentiments.51  
Manuscripts of Reid’s lectures show that he questions that sympathy can be 
understood as an act of the imagination. For Reid an act of the imagination does not have 
to give rise to feelings. He writes: ‘I can imagine my self to be undergoing a severe chirurgical 
operation, I can imagine a racking pain to accompany this operation without feeling that pain 
in the least. To imagine pain and to feel pain are things totally distinct nor does the first imply 
any degree of the last.’ (Stewart-Robertson and Norton 1984: 311) 
Perhaps Reid’s most pressing objection is that Smith has not properly accounted for 
the source of normativity. According to Reid, Smith’s account of sympathy presupposes a 
moral faculty that operates antecedent to sympathy: 
 
It is evident that this Sympathy supposes a moral Judgment and consequently a 
moral faculty. It is impossible to judge that a man ought to be affected in such a 
manner in certain circumstances unless we have some faculty by which we perceive 
that [h]is being affected in this way is [wrong] right and that his being affected in 
such another way is [right] wrong[.] Now this is what we call a moral faculty. 
Therefore it appears to me that this definition of Sympathy makes a moral faculty 
																																																						
51 For further helpful discussion of the differences between Hume’s and Smith’s accounts 
of sympathy, see Fleischacker (2013), Sayre-McCord (2013). 
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to be necessarly antecedent to our Sympathy and consequently our moral 
Sentiments cannot be the Effect of Sympathy[;] they must go before it, and set 
bounds to it. (Stewart-Robertson and Norton 1984: 314) 
 
Although Smith’s account of sympathy may initially appear to be better suited to 
accommodate correction of moral sentiments than Hume’s account, Reid argues that the 
normative judgements of propriety that are built into Smith’s account of sympathy 
presuppose a moral faculty. Thus, given Reid’s interpretation, the moral faculty rather than 
sympathy does the relevant work and as a result Smith’s view collapses.  
 
 
VII Classifications of principles of action  
 
Eighteenth-century Scottish philosophers develop detailed systems for the classification of 
principles of action. My aim in this section is to reflect on the changes and revisions that the 
classificatory systems underwent. Reid’s Essays on the Active Powers of Man offers one of the 
most detailed accounts of principles of action that has been developed in the period. Both 
Beattie (1790) and Stewart (1854–1860) build on Reid’s classifications in their own theories. 
However, Reid’s works and the works of his disciples also have their critics. In the early 
nineteenth century Thomas Brown (1778–1820) develops his own new classifications in his 
Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human Mind (1822 [1820]), which critique Reid’s and Stewart’s 
classifications and revive views held by Hume and Joseph Priestley. 
As we have seen, Reid and Stewart are both in agreement with Locke that it is 
important to distinguish volition from desire and Reid remarks that it is unfortunate that 
several philosophers have extended the scope of the will to include ‘desire, aversion, hope, 
fear, joy, sorrow, all our appetites, passions and affections, as different modifications of the 
will’ (2010 [1788]: II.1, 46). It is likely that his remark targets philosophers such as Hutcheson, 
Hume, or Kames.52 In Hutcheson’s philosophy desire becomes the dominant notion that 
captures the domain of the will. For Hume actions are governed by passions, and for Kames 
actions necessarily presuppose a prior motive.  
As already mentioned Reid identifies three types of principles of actions and classifies 
them as follows: 
 
																																																						
52 See the editorial note in Reid (2010 [1788]: II.1, 46–47, fn 2). 
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• Mechanical principles 
o Instinct 
o Habit 
• Animal principles 
o Appetites 
o Desires 
o Benevolent affections 
o Malevolent affections 
• Rational principles 
o Regard to duty as a whole 
o Conscience, or sense of duty 
 
According to Reid, ‘Mechanical principles of actions produce their effect with any 
will or intention on our part. … Animal principles require intention and will in their 
operation, but not judgement. … [Rational principles] can have no existence in beings not 
endowed with reason, and, in all their exertions, require, not only intention and will, but 
judgment or reason. (2010 [1788]: III.iii.1, 152) 
Stewart’s The Philosophy of Active and Moral Principles builds upon Reid’s Essays on the 
Active Powers of Man. Yet he offers his own classification of principles of actions, which 
diverges from Reid. Stewart identifies the following principles:  
 
1. Appetites. 
2. Desires. 
3. Affections. 
4. Self-love. 
5. The Moral Faculty. 
The three first may be distinguished (for a reason which will afterwards appear) by 
the title of Instinctive or Implanted Propensitities; the two last by the title Rational and 
Governing Principles of Action. (1828: 1:12) 
 
Despite the similarities, Stewart departs from Reid, first, by not including Reid’s 
mechanical principles instinct and habit, and, second, by rejecting to the use of the term 
‘mechanical’ altogether.  
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In this regard Beattie’s classifications in his Elements of Moral Science are closer to 
Reid’s: 
 
Our principles of action are many and various; I will not undertake to give a complete 
enumeration: it may be sufficient to specify a few of the most remarkable; which I 
arrange under the following heads. 1. Instinct. 2. Habit. 3. Appetite. 4 Passions and 
Affections. 5. Moral Principles (1790: 220–21) 
 
Why does Stewart eliminate Reid’s mechanical principles? Stewart remarks ‘that the 
word mechanical, (under which he comprehends our instincts and habits,) cannot, in my opinion, 
be properly applied to any of our active principles.’ (1828: 1:13 fn) Reid is aware that in the 
strict and philosophical sense an action presupposes understanding and will. Thus, strictly 
speaking, it does not make sense to speak of mechanical principles of actions. Nevertheless, 
Reid switches to the popular sense of the word ‘action’ and explicitly alerts his readers to this 
fact (Reid 2010 [1788]: III.i.1, 74). 
Stewart’s objection is not merely a terminological point, though. He criticises Reid 
for failing to see that instincts, like appetites, satisfy Reid’s characterisation of animal 
principles: 
 
In Dr Reid’s arrangement, nothing appears more unaccountable, if not capricious, 
than to call our appetites animal principles, because they are common to man and to 
the brutes; and, at the same time, to distinguish our instincts by the title of mechanical;—
when, of all our active propensities, there are none in which the nature of man bears 
so strong an analogy to that of the lower animals as in these instinctive impulses. 
Indeed, it is from the conditions of the brutes that the word instinct is transferred to 
that of man by a sort of figure or metaphor. (Stewart 1828: 1:13 fn) 
 
For Stewart the classification ‘mechanical’ does not serve any purpose that is not 
already captured by animal principles. Therefore he regards it as redundant. However, why 
does Reid include mechanical principles in his classification? It is worth noting that Stewart’s 
objection assumes that Reid defines animal principles as common to humans and animals, 
but he neglects Reid’s additional characterisation, namely that ‘[a]nimal principles of action 
require intention and will in their operation’ (Reid 2010 [1788]: III.iii.1, 152). Since instincts 
do neither involve intention nor will, Reid has resources to resist Stewart’s criticism. 
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More generally, it can be asked though as to why Reid’s arguments for libertarian free 
will target the doctrine of necessity understood in mechanist term. Mechanism lost its 
attraction during the eighteenth century, because it is not well suited to explain chemical and 
physiological processes and philosophers such as Joseph Priestly advanced new versions of 
materialism that are suitable for explaining the activity of matter, which in turn provides a 
foundation for explaining how matter can think, act, and be alive.53  
Reid is well aware of Joseph Priestley’s materialism and necessitarianism, which Reid 
sees as fundamentally at odds with his own moral and religious views (1995: 164). Following 
Priestley’s publications of An Examination of Dr. Reid’s Inquiry into the Human Mind on the 
Principles of Common Sense, Dr. Beattie’s Essay on the Nature and Immutability of Truth, and Dr. 
Oswald’s Appeal to Common Sense in Behalf of Religion (1774) and Hartley’s Theory of the Human 
Mind, on the Principle of Association of Ideas (1775), Reid makes it his task to refute Priestley’s 
materialism (Reid 1995, Wood 1995). Reid’s refutation of materialism draws on Robert 
Whytt’s attack of materialism. Whytt (1714–1766) was a physician in Edinburgh, whose 
publication of Essay on the Vital and other Involuntary Motions of Animals (1751) received major 
attention in Scotland and beyond.54 As Reid’s manuscripts reveal, Reid considers it 
impossible that matter can be active (1995). He observes that matter cannot be put in motion 
without force and argues that ‘the Inertia of Matter is the only cause why Force is necessary 
to move it when at rest or to change its direction or Velocity when in Motion.’ (1995: 232) 
Taking for granted that matter is entirely passive, Reid endorses the view that action 
presupposes an immaterial being. For Reid matter can be divided into three classes, namely 
inanimate matter, vegetables, and animals (1995: 218). Inanimate matter ‘is constantly acted 
upon by something immaterial’ (1995: 218). Animals are distinguished from plants insofar as 
they are capable of thought, however small it may be. For instance, animals may feel small 
degrees of pleasure or pain. Reid maintains that ‘both vegetables and Animals are United to 
something immaterial, by such a Union as we conceive between Soul and Body, which Union 
continues while the Animal or Vegetable is alive, & is dissolved when it dies.’ (1995: 218–19) 
This shows that Reid’s division of the principles of action into mechanical, animal, and 
rational principles is integrated into his understanding of metaphysics and physiology.  
Thomas Brown questions the traditional distinction between the understanding and 
the will, as well as the distinction between intellectual and active powers of the mind in his 
																																																						
53 For further discussion concerning the collapse of mechanism and other forms of 
materialism, see Gaukroger (2010, 2016) and Wolfe (2015). See also Wright (2005). 
54 See Maas (2003), Wright (1990, 2000). 
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Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human Mind. Like Hume, he starts with mental phenomena and 
is reluctant to postulate mental faculties and powers outside the boundaries of human 
understanding. However, Brown’s criticism of the common systems of classification is not 
merely a point concerning human ignorance, but rather he points out that several emotions 
such as grief or astonishment cannot easily be classified under either of the existing 
categories. Grief, for instance, is not voluntary. Therefore, it does not seem appropriate to 
classify it as belonging to the will. However, it is not obvious that it falls under the 
understanding instead. Similarly, it can be questioned that grief is an active power. However, 
it is not clear that it is an intellectual power either (Brown 1822 [1820]: Lect. 16). Hence 
Brown believes that the traditional distinctions are misconceived and advocates for new 
classifications.55 He proposes to distinguish external affections of the mind from internal 
affections or states of the mind (1822 [1820]: Lect. 16). The latter is further subdivided into 
intellectual states of mind and emotions, as he explains in the following passage: 
 
The first great subdivision, then, which I would form, of the internal class, is into 
our intellectual states of mind, and our emotions. The latter of these classes comprehends 
all, or nearly all the mental states, which have been classed, by others, under the head 
of active powers. I prefer, however, the term emotions, partly, because I wish to avoid 
the phrase active powers,—which, I own, appears to me awkward and ambiguous, as 
opposed to other powers, which are not said to be passive; and partly, for reasons 
before mentioned, because our intellectual states or energies,—far from being 
opposed to our active powers,—are, as we have seen, essential elements of their 
activity,—so essential, that, without them, these never could have had the name of 
active; and because I wish to comprehend, under the term, various states of the mind, 
which cannot, with propriety, in any case, be termed active,—such as grief, joy, 
astonishment,—and others which have been commonly, though, I think, 
inaccurately, ascribed to the intellectual faculties,—such as the feelings of beauty and 
sublimity,—feelings, which are certainly much more analogous to our other 
emotions,—to our feelings of love or awe,—for example,—than to our mere 
remembrances or reasonings, or to any other states of mind, which can strictly be 
called intellectual. (1822 [1820]: Lect. 16, 251–52)  
 
																																																						
55 For more detailed discussion, see Dixon (2003: ch. 4). 
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Brown is the first to systematically introduce the term ‘emotion’ and to use it to refer to 
mental states that have previously been classified as appetites, affections, passions, or 
sentiments.56  
However, has Brown actually replaced the traditional distinction between the 
understanding and the will, or has he simply replaced Reid’s and Stewart’s principles of action 
with the term ‘emotion’? Brown does not acknowledge Reid’s distinction between active 
powers, namely the determining grounds of actions, and principles of actions, which include 
all incitements to action and not merely the determining grounds of actions. As Thomas 
Dixon (2003: 124-25) notes, emotions are passive and in this regard Brown’s new 
classificatory system differs from Reid’s and Stewart’s, because it does not include active 
mental states. Although Brown raises relevant concerns, his new classifications will not 
satisfy those who like Beattie, Reid, and Stewart believe that human agents are authors of 
their actions.57 
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